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ALD-015       NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2720 
____________ 
 
PAUL RENO LIVENGOOD, 
    Appellant, 
v. 
 
BUREAU OF PRISONS; ARCHIE LONGLEY, WARDEN 
 __________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania  
(D.C. Civ. No. 11-cv-00019) 
Magistrate Judge: Susan Paradise Baxter  
__________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 18, 2012 
Before: SLOVITER, VANASKIE and WEIS, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: November1, 2012) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
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 Appellant Paul Livengood, a federal prisoner, appeals the Magistrate Judge’s 
order denying his petition for writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
1
  For the 
reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm. 
Livengood was sentenced on December 3, 2007 in the United States District 
Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania to a term of imprisonment of 70 
months for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (felon in possession of a firearm) and 
26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (possession of an unregistered firearm).  Because Livengood 
does not have a high school diploma, he participated in the Bureau of Prison’s 
literacy program in an effort to earn his General Equivalency Degree (“GED”).  By 
December 2, 2008, he had earned 240 credit hours in the literacy program, and was 
making “good progress” and was demonstrating “good effort.”  He then took but 
did not pass the GED examination.  Although the literacy program was no longer 
mandatory for him, because he had completed 240 instructional hours, Livengood 
continued to participate, enrolling in a GED preparation class.   
By August 19, 2009, Livengood had completed 480 credit hours in the 
literacy program and was making “good progress” and was demonstrating “good 
effort.”  On January 28, 2010, Livengood withdrew from his GED class but 
continued with the BOP’s literacy program by substituting enrollment in a Life 
Skills program, officially known as the GOALS program.  On March 5, 2010, 
                                              
1
 The parties consented to jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge, see 28 U.S.C. 
§ 636(c)(1). 
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Livengood withdrew from the GOALS program, putting an end to his GED and/or 
literacy classes.  He was counseled by prison staff that his status would change 
from “GED Satisfactory Progress” to “GED Unsatisfactory Progress,” to no avail.  
He signed and executed the GED Program Withdrawal/Refusal Form, which 
contained a written warning that, as an inmate in GED Unsatisfactory Progress 
status, and in accordance with 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(c), he would be eligible to 
receive only 42 days of good conduct time per year served, and not the maximum 
54 days that inmates making satisfactory progress are eligible to earn.  
Livengood challenged the reduction in his good conduct time earning rate 
through the BOP’s administrative grievance process, alleging that he was entitled 
to receive 12 additional days of good credit time for each of the years that his GED 
progress was listed as “unsatisfactory, ” notwithstanding his voluntary withdrawal 
from the BOP’s literacy program.  The BOP denied his grievance, including at the 
highest level. 
On January 21, 2011, Livengood filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania, in which he contended that the reduction in his good conduct time 
earning rate constitutes “discipline” for withdrawing from the literacy program in 
violation of 28 C.F.R. § 544.73(c).  Following the submission of an answer by the 
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BOP and the administrative record, the Magistrate Judge denied the petition on the 
merits. 
Livengood appeals.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our 
Clerk granted Livengood leave to appeal in forma pauperis and advised him that 
the appeal was subject to summary dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or 
summary affirmance under Third Cir. LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.  He was invited to 
submit argument in writing, and he has done so.  Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 
and I.O.P. 10.6, we may summarily dispose of an appeal when it clearly appears 
that no substantial question is presented by the appeal.  We exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous standard 
to its findings of fact.  See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002). 
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) established a “mandatory 
functional literacy” program for “for all mentally capable inmates who are not 
functionally literate.”  18 U.S.C. § 3624(f)(1).  Inmates are required to participate 
in the program for a period of time “sufficient to provide the inmate with an 
adequate opportunity to achieve functional literacy.”  Id. at § 3624(f)(2).  In 
addition, the BOP is required to offer “appropriate incentives which lead to 
successful completion of such programs.”  Id.  Pursuant to the regulations which 
implement the statute, inmates who do not have a high school diploma or GED are 
required to participate in the program “for a minimum of 240 instructional hours or 
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until a GED is achieved, whichever occurs first.”  28 C.F.R. § 544.70.  Failure to 
complete 240 hours of instructions in the program can result in disciplinary action.  
28 C.F.R. § 544.75 (“As with other mandatory programs, such as work 
assignments, staff may take disciplinary action against an inmate lacking a GED 
credential or high school diploma if that inmate refuses to enroll in, and to 
complete, the mandatory 240 instructional hours of the literacy program.”). 
Inmates who are serving a term of imprisonment of more than one year are 
eligible to receive up to 54 days of good conduct time at the end of each year, 18 
U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1).  “In awarding credit under this section, the Bureau shall 
consider whether the prisoner … has earned, or is making satisfactory progress 
toward earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent degree.”  Id.  See also 28 
C.F.R. § 523.20(c)(1) (“For inmates serving a sentence for an offense committed 
on or after April 26, 1996, the Bureau will award *** 54 days credit for each year 
served (prorated when the time served by the inmate for the sentence during the 
year is less than a full year) if the inmate has earned or is making satisfactory 
progress toward earning a GED credential or high school diploma.”).  An inmate 
“shall be deemed to be making satisfactory progress toward earning a GED 
credential or high school diploma unless” the inmate refuses to enroll in the 
literacy program; the inmate commits a prohibited act during the program, or the 
inmate withdraws from the program.  28 C.F.R. § 544.73(b)(1)(i)–(iii).  “[I]f the 
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inmate has not earned or is not making satisfactory progress toward earning a GED 
credential or high school diploma,” the BOP shall award only 42 days of good 
conduct time.  28 C.F.R. § 523.20(c)(2).     
It is undisputed that Livengood completed the mandatory 240 hours of 
instruction, that he did not pass the GED examination, and that he continued on 
with the BOP’s literacy program by participating in the GOALS program, but then 
he voluntarily withdrew from that program in March, 2010, thus earning himself 
“GED unsatisfactory” status.  He does not contend that anything other than his own 
voluntary withdrawal from the GOALS program caused his status to change from 
satisfactory to unsatisfactory.  The regulation provides that withdrawal from the 
literacy program constitutes a basis for loss of “GED satisfactory” status, 28 C.F.R. 
§ 544.73(b)(1)(iii), and the statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1), provides that, based on 
his “GED unsatisfactory” status, Livengood is not eligible to earn the maximum 
good conduct time of 54 days per year.  After he withdrew from the literacy 
program, Livengood was not an inmate who “has earned, or is making satisfactory 
progress toward earning, a high school diploma or an equivalent degree.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3624(b)(1); 28 C.F.R. § 523.20(c)(2).  The reduction in his good conduct 
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time earning rate from 54 to 42 days was thus authorized by statute and 
regulation.
2
 
Livengood correctly notes that, pursuant to regulation, he cannot be 
disciplined for choosing to drop out of the literacy program once he has completed 
the mandatory 240 hours of instruction, see 28 C.F.R. § 544.73(c) (“At the end of 
240 instructional hours, … the unit team … shall meet with the inmate to 
encourage continued participation in the literacy program until the inmate earns a 
GED credential or high school diploma.  At these meetings, the inmate may elect 
not to continue in the literacy program, and no disciplinary action will be taken.”).  
The record establishes that he did indeed complete 240 instructional hours, but it 
also establishes that no disciplinary action was ever taken against him.  Bureau of 
Prison records indicate that no incident reports were filed, no misconduct hearings 
were held, and no sanctions were imposed as a result of Livengood’s voluntary 
withdrawal from the GOALS program.  The reduction in his good conduct time 
earning rate was not a sanction imposed pursuant to a misconduct adjudication.  
Accordingly, section 544.73(c) of the federal regulations does not support his 
claim for relief.    
                                              
2
 Program Statement 5350.28 provides instruction to BOP staff for administering the 
literacy program but it does not introduce any additional requirements that have any 
bearing on Livengood’s case. 
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Livengood also argues that, ultimately, he completed 573 instructional hours 
before he dropped out of the GOALS program, and, by statute, only 240 hours of 
instructional time are actually mandatory.  He thus should not be considered to be 
in “GED unsatisfactory” status, and he should be eligible to continue receiving the 
maximum of 54 days of good conduct time.  He notes that, because he dropped out 
of the GOALS program, he also is not permitted to continue with his computer 
class, and he cannot earn anymore than the lowest rate of salary for his prison job.  
The reduction in his good conduct time earning rate and the other negative 
consequences of his decision to drop out are punishments, he argues, tantamount to 
discipline, and a violation of constitutional due process.  
We do not agree.  Substantive due process protects the individual from the 
arbitrary exercise of the powers of government.  See Bello v. Walker, 840 F.2d 
1124, 1128 (3d Cir. 1988).  The BOP’s literacy program is plainly crucial to an 
inmate’s successful reintegration into society, see P.S. 5350.28, Section 1, Purpose 
and Scope (“literacy program is designed to help inmates develop foundational 
knowledge and skill in reading, math, and written expression, and to prepare 
inmates” to get the GED credential because a “high school diploma is the basis 
academic requirement for most entry-level jobs” and “[p]eople who function below 
this level often find it very difficult to get a job and carry out daily activities”), and 
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it is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair to give the maximum good conduct time 
reward to inmates who persevere in the program. 
For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm the order of the District 
Court denying Livengood’s petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
 
 
